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Legitimation and strategic maneuvering in the political field 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article combines a pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation, a 
sociological conception of legitimacy and a sociological theory of the political field. 
In particular, it draws on the theorization of the political field developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu and tries to determine what new insights into the concept of strategic 
maneuvering might be offered by a sociological analysis of the political field. I 
analyse a speech made by the President of Romania, Traian %ăVHVFX, following his 
suspension by Parliament in April 2007. I suggest that the argument developed in this 
speech can be regarded as an example of adjudication and I discuss its specificity as 
an adjudication in the political field in an electoral campaign. I also try to relate 
legitimation as political strategy to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the 
contradictory demands of the political field, which I see – following Bourdieu – as 
involving a double political game, a game of democratic representation and a game of 
power. 
 
KEYWORDS: adjudication, Bourdieu, legitimacy, legitimation, political field, 
pragma-dialectics, public justification, strategic maneuvering, Traian %ăVHVFX  
 
 
 
In this article I am trying to bring together a pragma-dialectical conception of 
argumentation, a sociological conception of legitimacy, as well as a sociological 
theory of the political field. I will draw on the pragma-dialectical theory of 
argumentation developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 2004) and 
particularly on the concept of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
2002), as well as on approaches to legitimacy by philosophers and sociologists 
(Habermas 1976, 1984, Beetham 1991). In particular, I will draw on the theorization 
of the political field developed by Bourdieu (1991). Using insights from these 
theoretical sources, I will try to analyze a political speech and relate argument 
evaluation issues to the characteristics of the political field and to a particular view of 
legitimacy. 
 
 
1. Approaches to ‘legitimation’ and ‘legitimacy’ 
 
In social and political theory, the concepts of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legitimation’ are 
generally defined in terms of concepts of argumentation, giving or having reasons, 
and justification. A standard view is that ‘the measure of legitimacy of regimes is 
fundamentally tied to discursive justifiability’ (D’Agostino 2007) and political 
philosophers have proposed different conceptions of public justifiability, hence 
different conceptions of legitimacy.   
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 For most contemporary theorists, to say that power is legitimate is to make 
either a descriptive or a normative judgment. Weber, for instance, understood 
legitimate authority in the descriptive sense: power is legitimate if people believe it to 
be legitimate. Other theorists insist on ‘good reasons’: there must be some ‘reasonable 
consensus’ (Rawls), or ‘rationally motivated agreement’ or ‘rational consensus’ 
(Habermas). On a descriptive approach, to say that a regime is legitimate is to make a 
report on people’s beliefs. On a normative view, it is to pass a (moral) judgment on 
that regime.  On the normative approach, legitimacy is tied to a process of public 
justification. In turn, public justification is tied to ‘reasonableness’, i.e. it is 
understood as ‘reasonableness from every point of view’.  It thus becomes possible to 
say that ‘no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every individual’s point 
of view’ (D’Agostino 2007). This strong requirement is then read either as referring to 
actual individuals’ beliefs or to what individuals would believe if they were better 
informed, or placed in some other ‘ideal’ counterfactual situation. 1 
  There are at least two major normative views: Habermas’s and Rawls’s. 
According to Habermas, legitimacy designates ‘the worthiness of a political order to 
be recognized’, or, in other words, that ‘there are good arguments for a political order 
to be recognized as right and just’ (Habermas 1996: 248). In modernity, when 
‘ultimate’ grounds are no longer plausible, legitimacy becomes procedural. It is now 
the formal procedures and conditions on possible consensus formation that possess 
legitimizing force.  A normative claim becomes legitimate if it is the object of an 
‘agreement that comes to pass among all parties, as free and equal’, at the end of a 
process of deliberation that is free from deception and the distorting constraints of 
power, and thus embodies the general interest. Similarly, Rawls (1993) proposes a 
view of legitimate social arrangements based on a notion of ‘reasonable consensus’. 
The basic principle of reasonableness asserts that reasonable persons will propose to 
other persons terms of cooperation that are fair  only on condition that these terms can 
be justified to those others on the basis of premises that they can reasonably accept 
(Christiano 2004).2 
   Beetham’s (1991) sociological account of legitimacy is critical of both 
Weber’s descriptive approach and of normative approaches that impose too strong and 
a-historical constraints on judgments of legitimacy. For the latter, Beetham argues, 
power is legitimate when the rules that govern it are justifiable according to rationally 
defensible moral principles and these embody a universalizing claim: it is not the 
principles that happen to pertain in a given society at a given time that are at issue 
here, but those that any rational person, upon considered and unbiased reflection, 
would have to agree to (Beetham 1991: 4). The disadvantage of this view, Beetham 
shows, is that it divorces judgements of legitimacy from context and history. Instead, 
he suggests a view of legitimacy-in-context, based on the following crucial claim: ‘A 
given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but 
because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs’ (Beetham 1991:11). Consequently, 
power is legitimate to the extent that: 
 
(a) it conforms to established rules  (level of rules); 
(b) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and 
subordinate (level of justifications grounded in beliefs);  
(c) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation 
(level of action) (Beetham 1991:16). 
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I am going to adopt Beetham’s approach in my analysis of the speech made by the 
President of Romania, Traian %ăVHVFX, following his suspension by Parliament in 
April 2007.  I will try to show how self-legitimation and delegitimation of political 
opponents and of associated standpoints proceeds by drawing on the three levels 
identified by Beetham, and by invoking various types of ‘rules’: legal rules, 
democratic rules, as well as by drawing on different sets of beliefs and norms 
allegedly shared by the audience. I will try to address three particular issues:  
 
(a) In the spirit of recent research in pragma-dialectics, I will look at the text as 
(partly) an adjudication, and discuss its specificity as an adjudication in the 
political field in an electoral campaign. 
(b) Drawing on the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1991), I will place this 
speech within the broadly-defined rules of the political field, in order to 
explore the way in which the particular rules or logic of the political field 
might bear upon judgments of reasonableness.  
(c) Finally, in my concluding section, I will relate legitimation as political strategy 
to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the contradictory demands of the 
social and political fields. 
 
 
2. Legitimacy as a multi-level concept. Different ‘levels’ of legitimacy in the 
‘legal’ yet ‘illegitimate’ suspension of the President of Romania. 
 
Parliament suspended the President of Romania on the 20th of April 2007 and called 
the referendum on the grounds that %ăVHVFX, who had always described himself as an 
active president, had exceeded his legitimate constitutional powers. In 2004, %ăVHVFX 
became president because he promised to put a stop to corruption and the attempt to 
impeach him can be taken as a concerted reaction to his anti-corruption campaign. In 
Parliament, 322 MPs voted in favour of the suspension and 108 against. A month 
later, however, in the referendum (on May 19, 2007), the Romanian electorate  
rejected Parliament’s attempt to impeach  the President.  Approximately 75% of those 
who went to the polls voted against impeachment and approximately 25% voted in 
favour. 
 One of the characteristics of the one-month campaign between the suspension 
and the referendum was an explicit focus on legitimacy. Parliament asserted its own 
legitimacy, as elected representative of the people, and the legitimacy of the 
Constitution, which %ăVHVFX had allegedly violated. %ăVHVFX, media commentators 
and members of the public denied the legitimacy of the Parliament, by pointing out 
that the majority of the population disapproved of the suspension and the 
impeachment. More interestingly still, they argued that, although Parliament is a 
democratically elected institution in principle, it was not really legitimate at all, given 
that its members had not been elected individually, by uninominal vote, but on party 
lists.  
 These various views can be translated into Beetham’s three-level framework. 
For instance, %ăVHVFX’s position was illegitimate, according to some people, because 
it violated the limited prerogatives granted to the President by the Romanian 
Constitution, i.e. according to the first level, of ‘rules’. On the other hand, for all of 
those who questioned the Constitution itself and the laws which defined the legal 
powers of the President and Parliament, %ăVHVFX was not illegitimate. Or, again, for a 
great many people, %ăVHVFX seemed to be perfectly legitimate in his actions from the 
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perspective of the rules of the democratic game (first level) and also from the 
perspective of most people’s shared beliefs and normative expectations (second level).  
Equally, we can say he was legitimate from the point of view of the expressed consent 
of a significant proportion of the population. The position of his opponents (the 322 
MPs) was legitimate from the point of view of the level of rules (first level), if by 
rules we understand the Constitution, and illegitimate from the same perspective if by 
rules we understand a democratic system in which MPs are expected to represent the 
will of the majority. It was also illegitimate from the point of view of most people’s 
shared beliefs and norms (second level), and their expressed consent (third level).  
 
 
3. The institutional context: adjudication as activity type 
 
I am going to look at the text of %ăVHVFX’s suspension speech as an instance of 
adjudication in the political field. In so doing, I am drawing on recent developments 
in pragma-dialectics which suggest that fallacy judgments may depend on various 
contextual factors, and may not be produced simply by comparing the argumentation 
in question with the set of rules that define critical discussion. One dimension or 
aspect of the context is the institutional context, and more specifically, the activity 
type that the arguers are engaged in, seen as a culturally established and codified 
practice, with a more or less fixed format. In various articles, van Eemeren (2006) and 
van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005, 2006) compare the  argumentative activity types 
of adjudication, mediation and negotiation and argue that the institutional 
circumstances inherent in a specific activity type determine the dialectical 
preconditions for strategic maneuvering.  They define adjudication as an activity type 
that aims for the termination of a dispute by a third party, rather than the resolution of 
a difference of opinion by the parties themselves. In adjudication, the parties readjust 
their roles from trying to convince each other to trying to convince the presumably 
neutral, impartial adjudicator.   
 As an activity type, the interaction between %ăVHVFX as protagonist and the 
audience seems to combine features of an argumentative discussion between two 
parties (%ăVHVFX and his immediate public) with features of an adjudication, i.e. the 
President is presenting  his case, trying to legitimize his position in front of the people 
as adjudicator, of which the particular assembly he is addressing seems to be a 
metonymical subset. This is not prototypical adjudication and I will identify features 
of it which make it atypical and which may be said to arise from the properties of the 
political field. However, my suggestion that the interaction can be regarded in these 
terms, as an adjudication,  is supported by the fact that the people were in fact called 
upon to decide, through a referendum, on May 19, whether %ăVHVFX was ‘guilty’ of 
the accusations brought against him; and especially that, in the speech in question, 
%ăVHVFX does try to clear himself of the accusations and plead his case before the 
people.   
 In this speech, %ăVHVFX is addressing an implicit difference of opinion among 
the electorate, between those who would vote Yes in the impeachment referendum and 
those who would vote No. There are several participants in this interaction:  %ăVHVFX 
as the main protagonist, the immediate, co-present public as antagonist and 
protagonist, the 322 MPs that voted against %ăVHVFX as a represented protagonist. 
There are two publics. There is, on the one hand, an immediate public, who engages 
in interaction with %ăVHVFX, and occasionally expresses agreement or voices some 
distinct standpoint of its own. There is also a more general, wider public, who is cast 
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here in the role of a supposedly neutral adjudicator that eventually has to give a 
verdict. In addressing his immediate audience of supporters (an audience that does not 
really need to be persuaded), %ăVHVFX is at the same time addressing the wider public, 
the electorate. In constructing and exploiting the consensus of views with his 
immediate public, he is actively constructing a wider consensus with parts of the 
electorate that might vote against him. He seems to address his immediate audience as 
a sort of metonymical subset of the Romanians at large and to attribute  identical 
value commitments to these two publics. Nowhere is it apparent from his speech that 
amongst the wider audience there might be a significant proportion of voters who 
might choose to vote in favour of the impeachment.  
 Here is the text of the speech that Traian %ăVHVFX made after his suspension by 
Parliament, in Constitution Square, in Bucharest, on April 22, 2007 (my translation). 
(The speech is in italics, to avoid confusion with my own comments):  
 
“Welcome. It’s good to be here with you. I want to thank you for sacrificing a Sunday 
to come here so that together we might reassert our confidence in democracy and in 
the rule of law. (…) I would like to begin by wishing a happy name day to all those 
men and women whose name is connected to Saint George. Tomorrow Saint George 
will also inaugurate the campaign for the referendum. Are we expected to fight a 
dragon? I think we are. It is that part of the state created during transition that will 
not accept that the time has come for Romania to become a modern state. One where 
institutions work for the citizens, wherever they might find themselves.”  
 
 
From the very beginning, %ăVHVFXconstructs an audience that shares his values, his 
alleged ‘confidence in democracy’ (he invokes these as helpful concessions for his 
case at the opening stage) and clearly places the discussion within the framework of a 
particular 'game' and set of 'rules': the democratic game, and not, for instance, the 
Constitution (which is the set of rules that his opponents are relying on). The analogy 
with Saint George and the Dragon defines the roles of the participants in this political 
battle: %ăVHVFX cast himself and the public as a collective positive hero, while the 
opponents (the 322 MPs) are cast in the role of an enemy of Romania’s institutional 
modernization and of the interests of the citizens. From the start, therefore, the 
conflict with his opponents is defined by the protagonist in a self-serving way, as a 
battle for or against modernization. 
 
“A few days ago, 322 members of the Romanian Parliament voted in favour of 
suspending the President. The Romanian Parliament is a safeguard, ought to be a 
safeguard of your freedoms, of the prosperity of each Romanian, of the welfare of 
each Romanian. But we have one problem with these 322 members of parliament. Are 
they representing you in their vote? ([Crowd: ‘No!!!]) What we have here is a 
manifestation of institutions of the state that do not take into consideration the will of 
the people. These people believe that the institutions of the state are at their service 
and they place them at their service and not at the service of the people. “ 
 
This paragraph is crucial to %ăVHVFX’s argument, as it introduces the challenge 
addressed to the 322 MPs that they do not in fact represent the will of the electorate. 
He claims (and the assembly agrees) that the fundamental rule of the democratic 
game, i.e. democratic representation, is violated: instead of representing the people, 
these MPs are serving their own interests. Implicitly, the 322 are illegitimate as they 
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violate the rules of democracy and people’s shared values and normative expectations 
(the first and second level in Beetham’s definition).  
 
“Let me explain… [Crowd: ‘Traitors!’ ‘Traitors!’] No, they have only become 
detached from the interests of the people they claim to be representing. They are not 
traitors. They have only lost contact with the people that sent them into Parliament, 
these 322. Many of them may not even know why they voted as they did. This is what 
their bosses told them to do. They could tell them because they were not voted by each 
and every one of you. They were on a party list and, unfortunately, they are no longer 
on your list, on the list of the Romanian citizens. And our duty is to ask them to do 
their duty.” 
 
Interestingly, %ăVHVFX refuses an option that is presented to him here by the audience, 
he refuses to call these MPs ‘traitors’ (he seems to view it as an ad hominem attack, 
therefore as an unacceptable move) and delegitimizes his opponent in a more 
reasonable way, in relation to premises that the audience already accepts: they are not 
’traitors’ but they have failed in the mission to faithfully represent the people who 
sent them into Parliament.  The opponents’ standpoint is delegitimized and discredited 
because the opponent is shown not to be playing by the publicly accepted rules of the 
democratic game. %ăVHVFX also refers to a problematic aspect of the law itself: 
elections are on party lists, so that MPs are not elected directly by the citizens. He 
problematizes here the relation between the first level, that of the rules, and their 
justifiability in terms of shared beliefs, and conveys implicitly (through 
presupposition: ‘unfortunately...’) that there is a clash between the rules, as they are, 
and what they should be, according to people’s expectations (again between the same 
two levels). The last assertion in the paragraph above is an interesting instance in 
which the immediate audience, but possibly also the Romanian people, as adjudicator, 
is included in a collective ‘us’ that includes the protagonist.  
 
“In fact, what  have I done to upset these 322 parliamentarians? I asked for high 
quality in the education system. Was I wrong in asking for this? [Crowd: ‘No!!!]  I 
wasn’t wrong. I asked that the reform of the health system should be done for the 
people. Was I wrong? [Crowd: ‘No!!!] I wasn’t wrong. I have condemned the crimes 
of communism. Was I wrong? [Crowd: ‘No!!!]  I wasn’t wrong. I have transferred the 
archives of the Securitate to the CNSAS so that nobody might be blackmailed in this 
country ever again. Was I wrong? [Crowd: ‘No!!!] I wasn’t wrong. (...) I have asked 
Parliament to introduce the uninominal vote in the next elections. Was I wrong? 
[Crowd: ‘No!!!]  I wasn’t wrong. “ 
 
%ăVHVFX is here eliciting from the interlocutor their agreement on premises whereby 
he progressively builds his own case. Upon being questioned, the audience agrees that 
it is not wrong to ask for various changes in the activity of various institutions. 
%ăVHVFX seems in fact to be conducting an ‘intersubjective identification procedure’, 
whereby he is making explicit, actually constructing the level of shared beliefs in 
terms of which the audience is supposed to evaluate his standpoint.   
 
“These are just a few of the reasons why, on the day of referendum, the vote you will 
have to cast for the impeachment of the President should be just one: ‘No!’  [Crowd: 
‘%ăVHVFX! %ăVHVFX!] These 322 Parliamentarians, and I repeat, 322 
Parliamentarians, and not the Romanian Parliament, must receive one answer at the 
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referendum: ‘No’. The  answer that shows that the President of Romania was not 
wrong to ask for  the modernization of this country in favour of the Romanian 
people.”  
  
Here, the protagonist is making it clear that he has presented good reasons why the 
audience (and presumably the Romanians at large) should vote against the 
impeachment.  There is an effective instance of strategic maneuvering at this point, 
with the help of dissociation: it is not the legitimacy of Parliament that %ăVHVFX LV
contesting, but only that of the 322 MPs. He is thus making it clear that he is not 
contesting the principle of democratic representation but only a particular case in 
which its functioning was distorted.  More interestingly, in this passage he is clearly 
expressing what is at stake in the confrontation. It is in fact a clash of values, norms, 
beliefs, between the supporters and the enemies of ‘modernization’. Whoever will 
vote No will be on the side of those who advocate modernization in favour of the 
Romanians, based on the view that institutions should serve the people, not private 
interests.  
 
“I would like you to know that I have an explanation for those who say that the 
President will not negotiate. What is there to negotiate? I would like to negotiate, but 
what? The ongoing lawsuits in the lawcourts? I can’t negotiate them. What can I 
negotiate? The laws and government decisions whereby favours are granted to the 
political clientele? I can’t negotiate those. What is there to negotiate? My peace of 
mind and my stability in office in order to be agreeable to the 322 by betraying my 
own electorate and the Romanian people? I could never do that. I’d rather fight 
openly with those who want another kind of Romania than the one you want.” 
 
Here, the protagonist orients explicitly to the conventions of another activity type, 
negotiation, only to reject the possibility of negotiating with his opponents: the 
matters under discussion are said to be non-negotiable. To negotiate would apparently 
contravene both the democratic rules of the game and widely shared norms and beliefs 
(it would be a 'betrayal’). This is, implicitly, because negotiation or compromise 
would mean that the interests of the opponents are also legitimate, albeit different 
from the interests of other Romanians. But their interests are not legitimate, they 
actually run against the interests of the people (‘they want another kind of Romania’, 
etc.) and this is why they cannot form the object of a negotiation.   
 Together with the possibility of negotiation, what seems to be rejected as well 
is the possibility of rational, critical discussion with the opponents. ‘There is nothing 
to negotiate’ means ‘there is nothing to discuss’, and this does not seem to be an 
unreasonable move in politics  whenever there is no common basis for discussion in 
terms of shared beliefs and values.  If the standpoint of the opponent is shut out from 
consideration here, it is because the opponent does not allegedly play by the rules of 
the democratic game (i.e. there is an inconsistency between what these MPs ought to 
be and what they actually are: they are ‘representatives’ that do not ‘represent’). There 
is also a refusal of negotiation and dialogue on the grounds of the urgency of action, 
as opposed to discussion – again, a reasonable move in the political field, where 
public deliberation eventually has to give way to decision and to action, whether or 
not consensus on a matter has been achieved. The urgency of action is expressed in 
terms that the public could not disagree with, given their beliefs and value 
commitments, as the protagonist has constructed them up to this point: 
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“We are not allowed to delay the transformation of the Romanian state until we can 
finally negotiate what can be done. We need a modern state now, a state where the 
money can reach the wretched peasant who has to do something with his wretched 
piece of land. Where the money can reach the villages… (…)The money must get to 
the people to spread prosperity to all and not only to the political clientele. This is a 
battle that we must all fight together.”  
 
Throughout these passages, the audience (and the adjudicator) is attributed the same 
values, concerns, needs and beliefs with %ăVHVFX and is invited to join the protagonist 
in the battle for modernization. 
 
“I was suspended with a total of 322 votes against one man. What the 322 members of 
Parliament did not understand was this: that they were not canceling the mandate of 
one man, but the vote of millions of Romanians. And this is unacceptable in a 
democracy. Practically, all of us are suspended citizens, suspended by 322 people. 
Who has given these 322 people the right to suspend our democracy?” 
 
%ăVHVFX claims here that the suspension of a democratically elected president is in 
contradiction with the rules of the democratic game (so, it is illegitimate from the 
point of view of the observance of democratic rules, the first level in Beetham’s 
definition). To suspend a democratically elected President is, according to %ăVHVFX, to 
cancel the votes of the people who elected him. From this, he moves on to the 
following equivalence: to suspend a president is to suspend the citizens who support 
him. Even more surprisingly, to suspend a democratically elected President is to 
suspend democracy itself (the principle of representation). These are examples of 
strategic maneuvering that gets badly derailed, strictly speaking, through false 
analogies.  Most probably, however, these derailments went unnoticed for most of the 
audience and may have been quite effective in furthering %ăVHVFX’s case.  
 
“Dear friends, (…) I come before you not as a representative of one party or another, 
or of any group. At the referendum I will stand before you as a representative of the 
Romanians… (…)  My constitutional status means that I am a representative of the 
Romanians that has been called into question by 322 members of Parliament but is 
confronted with the vote of 22 million Romanians. I assure you that throughout this 
campaign I will act as a representative of the Romanians confronted with 322 
members of Parliament.” 
 But one thing has to be clear: nobody has given a mandate to these 322 
members of Parliament to vote for the suspension of the President of Romania. They 
received their mandate from the oligarchs. And I am certain that any Romanian will 
vote against the oligarchs.” 
 
%ăVHVFX is again thematizing his status as representative of the people, of all the 
Romanians, in a confrontation with the 322 MPs who represent private interests. He 
shows that he is legitimate by reference to both systems of rules, the Constitution and 
democracy: he was elected democratically and he submits himself again to a 
democratic vote. Again, he invokes representation as a fundamental rule and claims 
that  the 322 MPs are illegitimate vis-a-vis this rule, as they have not received a 
mandate from them, but from private interest groups (the ‘oligarchs’). More clearly 
than anywhere else, he asserts that the position of the people as adjudicator has to be 
against %ăVHVFX’s opponents, because the opponents’ position is fundamentally that of 
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the ‘oligarchs’. In voting Yes, the Romanians would in fact support the interests of the 
‘oligarchs’. Unlike the 322 MPs, %ăVHVFX claims to be fully representative of the will 
of the people: he is merely a spokesperson and a servant of the will of the people:    
 
 
“Please rest assured that my mandate is one which I dedicate primarily to you, that it 
is a mandate which, for the first time, a President refuses to use for his own peace of 
mind, or as a mandate for the peace of institutions, for the peace of the oligarchs. I 
want this mandate to be devoted to you, even if this might lead to disputes, even if it 
might require the strength not to give in, and the obstinacy to serve the Romanians to 
the end.” 
 
A schematic reconstruction of %ăVHVFX’s argument might look as follows (in brackets, 
I indicate which particular level in Beetham’s definition of legitimacy is drawn upon): 
 
1. You should vote No in the referendum. (Claim). 
 
1.1. The 322 MPs violate democratic rules (they do not represent the people but the 
‘oligarchs’). (L1) 
 1.1’. (We believe that) this is unacceptable in a democracy. (L2, L3) 
 
1.2. The 322 MPs are against Romania’s modernization.    
       1.2’. (We believe) that the time has come for Romania to become a modern 
state, a state where institutions work for citizens, etc. (L2) 
 
1.3. I advocate institutional modernization.  
 1.3’. (We believe) it is not wrong/ the President was not wrong to ask for 
modernization of the education system, of the health system, of activity of 
government, etc. (L2, L3) 
 1.3”.We need a modern state now, we believe the money should reach the 
poor people, etc. (L2, L3) 
     
1.4. I represent the Romanians (both according to the Constitution and according to 
the rules of democracy). (L1, as two distinct systems of rules) 
 1.4’ (We believe in the legitimacy of the Constitution.) 
1.4” We believe in democratic representation.  (L2, L3) 
 
 
Premise 1.2a, for example, is supported by invoking people’s beliefs (L2), but also by 
eliciting the audience’s consent (L3) by means of direct questions: ‘Was it wrong for 
me to ask for x, y, z?’, to which the audience replies: ‘No!’. Shared beliefs 
(Beetham’s second level) are invoked either to support the protagonist’s position (1.3, 
1.4) or to indicate that there is a clash with the opponents’ position (1.1, 1.2): shared 
beliefs contravene the way in which the opponents are playing the political game.   
 What is most interesting about this argument is the way in which the 
difference of opinion over whether Băsescu should be impeached is redefined by the 
protagonist as one over whether Romania should become a modern democratic state:  
according to the protagonist, to vote Yes is to vote against modernization and against 
democracy. It  can be argued that the topic of ‘modernization’, as a fairly abstract, 
meta-level reflection on the state of affairs in Romania, ran the risk of appearing 
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irrelevant to the discussion, and its justificatory potential to the claim defended may 
have not been immediately obvious to parts of the audience. The protagonist, 
however, elicited sufficient agreement from the audience that the 322 MPs were 
acting against the interests of modernization and democracy, and that, moreover, what 
people believed and wanted was practically tantamount to a modern democratic state,  
for this instance of strategic maneuvering at the confrontation stage to appear 
perfectly reasonable. 
 Another interesting example of strategic maneuvering (this time, at the 
opening stage) which  draws on the conventions of the adjudication as activity type is 
the way in which the protagonist redefines premises that are accepted as mutual 
concessions into propositions that serve his own rhetorical objectives, while 
preserving the compatibility of these revised propositions with the original 
concessions. Starting from the same set of shared premises at the opening stage (a 
mutual recognition of the President’s over-active involvement in various domains), 
the two parties can be seen as  moving in opposite directions, arguing for different 
claims or interpretations of the facts. More precisely, drawing on these shared 
premises, together with an interpretation of these that is not favourable to %ăVHVFX, 
plus reference to a legal background, %ăVHVFX’s opponents claim that the President is 
not legitimate because he has not obeyed the rules of the Constitutional game which 
the population also allegedly adheres to. For his part, drawing on the same shared 
premises, on another type of normative background (democracy), and on a self-
serving interpretation of the mutual concessions, %ăVHVFXFRQVWUXFWVDQDUJXPHQWRI
legitimation for himself. His position is allegedly legitimate because he has 
consistently played by the rules of the democratic game, whose fundamental principle 
is representation of the interests of the people, and this is a set of rules that the 
population allegedly widely supports. 3 
 In what way is this adjudication different from the typical adjudications going 
on in the legal field? In principle, the adjudicator is or should be neutral and cannot be 
enlisted by either party in support of their cause. Thus, it is striking to observe how 
%ăVHVFX claims commonality of values, goals etc. with the adjudicator on matters 
which are strictly relevant to the success of his case (‘I am certain that every 
Romanian will vote against the oligarchs’). Because he and the adjudicator are 
allegedly committed to the same values, it can only follow that, when presented with 
the facts, the adjudicator can only decide in %ăVHVFX’s favour. This peculiarity arises 
from the particular kind of political game %ăVHVFX is engaged in, and from the 
particularities of the political field in an electoral situation, where the adjudicator is 
the people, and each party or politicians supposedly represents the interests of the 
people as ultimate adjudicator. To enlist the adjudicator on your side and invest it with 
a commitment to the values, goals, etc. that you stand for, is therefore presumably not 
an unreasonable move in the political field, but may have to do with the logic or 
principles of the political field, as I will suggest below. 
 To conclude, a form of adjudication is what is apparently going on and those 
involved conspire in creating that appearance (by apparently asking for and offering 
judgment). But adjudication is in a sense not what is going on.  The adjudicator seems 
to be here less of an impartial judge than a construct of the protagonist’s own making. 
This is because the adjudicator is not merely the electorate, as an aggregate of 
different views and options, but a more unitary entity, the people, a construct 
endowed by the protagonist  with all the commitments to those values and beliefs that 
will help forward his own case. So, in apparently asking for the people’s objective 
judgment, the protagonist is in fact presenting a case defined in terms that will serve 
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his rhetorical objectives to a judge whom he has discursively constructed as sharing 
exactly those commitments that will argue for his case.  
  
 
4. The contradictory logic of the social and political fields 
 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1991) analyzes the political field as a site par 
excellence in which words are actions and the symbolic character of power is at stake. 
It is a field of forces and of struggles aimed at transforming the relation of forces 
which confers on this field its structure at any given moment. Agents in the political 
field are continuously engaged in a labour of representation by which they seek to 
construct and impose a particular vision of the social world (i.e. a particular ideology, 
or ‘truth’), while at the same time seeking to mobilize the support of those upon whom 
their power ultimately depends. These visions cannot be assessed independently of 
their power of mobilization. ‘Thus, the production of ideas about the social world is 
always in fact subordinated to the logic of the conquest of power, which is the logic of 
the mobilization of the greatest number’. Politicians, in other words, have to produce 
‘ideas that are capable of producing groups’ (Bourdieu 1991: 181-182). The 
underlying logic of the political, as Bourdieu understands it, has to do with 
mobilization, i.e. with power, not primarily with truth. Politicians can obtain power if 
their ideas are recognized by a majority, if they can mobilize a higher number than 
their political competitors. The power of a discourse ‘depends less on its intrinsic 
properties than on the mobilizing power it exercises – that is, at least to some extent, 
on the degree to which it is recognized by a numerous and powerful group’ (Bourdieu 
1991: 188).  And one issue to speculate on is to what extent this particular logic 
affects the boundaries of reasonableness in the political field.  
 Bourdieu speaks of the political ‘game’ as a ‘double game’ (Bourdieu 1991: 
180-183), in which the ‘external’ relation of politicians to the electorate is 
subordinated to the ‘internal’ struggle for power within the political system. There is 
‘duality of frames of reference’: the politician is simultaneously playing a game in the 
political field, against his competitors, and a game in the social field, in which he 
represents his electorate. There is a ‘homology’ between these frames of reference, 
such that politicians ‘serve the interests of others in so far (and only in so far) as they 
also serve themselves while serving others’ (Bourdieu 1991: 183). In other words, a 
successful move in one game is also a successful move in the other game. Or, if a 
politician allows himself to be discredited by a political opponent, he is at the same 
time doing a disservice to his own electorate. 
 The game of representation of the views and interests of the electorate 
typically takes the form of a game of democratic representation, in which politicians 
claim to represent the interests of the entire population or of large sections, as power 
depends on successful mobilization of majorities. In terms of the analysis undertaken 
here, we can say that %ăVHVFX is playing an (external) game of ‘democratic 
representation’ (he is an alleged spokesperson, giving voice to the vision of the public, 
he knows ‘what kind of Romania’ the public wants) and an (internal) ‘power game’ 
within the political field against his competitors. He can win the game against his 
political adversaries if he plays the game of democratic representation in such a way 
as to gain the adherence of the highest number of people. The way in which he has to 
play this latter game is thus subordinated to the imperative of mobilization, as it is the 
power to mobilize that gives politicians their power in relation to their competitors.   
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 In any society there will always be disagreement that is irreducible.  Yet, there 
is a need for decision and action and for an end to disagreement. The basic idea 
behind the democratic conception of legitimate authority is that when there are 
disagreements, more exactly when public deliberation fails to deliver a consensus on 
the common good, the way forward is by means of a decision-making process that is 
fair to the views and interests of all members, in the only way in which it can possibly 
be fair, by submitting issues to a democratic vote and deciding that one will defer to 
the decision of the majority (Christiano 2004).  In other words, disagreements over 
substantive conceptions of what social arrangements should be are overridden by a 
fundamental agreement on the legitimacy of democratic procedure.  
 In his speech, %ăVHVFX Ls very insistent on the theme of democratic 
representation and he makes it appear straightforward and unproblematic: the 
representative speaks in the name of the people and expresses the people’s wishes, the 
people give a mandate of representation to politicians in order to make their voices 
heard and can  withdraw this mandate when politicians do not express and serve  their 
interests. There is also a repeated insistence on the idea of modernization and on the 
construction of a consensus around this idea. Yet, modernization is the only 
substantive topic on which consensus is invoked, and, as the dialogue with the 
audience shows, readily obtained. Most of the speech focuses on the idea of 
democratic representation, which is a procedure, a principle. Why is the protagonist 
drawing so heavily on democratic representation as a topical choice? Is this topic 
suggested perhaps by the properties of the political field? 
 %ăVHVFX seems to know that, if he can convincingly show that his opponents 
are violating the democratic game, while he is playing fairly by the rules of this game, 
he will succeed in mobilizing a large part of the electorate. This is because, on a 
variety of substantive issues, the electorate will be predictably divided. There is no 
point in raising potentially controversial substantive issues, unless one can be certain 
that there is consensus on that issue (e.g. the desirability of modernization). However, 
as %ăVHVFX knows, there is a wide consensus on the desirability of democratic 
processes. This is the one consensus that it is therefore strategically advisable to draw 
on and to identify one’s own position with. 
 According to Bourdieu, however, the situation is much more complex than it 
appears.  The political field involves a paradox: individuals cannot constitute 
themselves as a group with a voice, capable of making themselves heard in the 
political field unless they dispossess themselves in favour of a spokesperson in whom 
they vest the right to speak on their behalf. There is a ‘monopoly of the professionals’ 
that goes hand in hand with this ‘dispossession’, or ‘delegation’ of power from the 
people to the politician. In all these cases of dispossession, Bourdieu argues, ‘in 
appearance the group creates the man who speaks in its place and in its name … 
whereas in reality it is more or less just as true to say that it is the spokesperson who 
creates the group’ (Bourdieu 1991: 204). Thus, instead of a politician expressing the 
interests of the group, what we have in fact is a politician postulating group-interests 
that favour his own position in the political field.  
 Bourdieu also speaks about a so-called ‘oracle effect’: ‘the fact of speaking for 
someone, that is, on behalf of and in the name of someone, implies the propensity to 
speak in that person’s place’. Thus, the spokesperson is speaking ‘in the name of 
something which he brings into existence by his very discourse’, ‘producing both the 
message and the interpretation of the message’, while giving the illusion of being just 
a ‘symbolic substitute’ (Bourdieu 1991: 209 -212). It is in apparently abolishing his 
own voice and identity completely, in becoming a representative of the people, that 
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the politician appropriates the power of the people.  And in allegedly acting as a 
spokesperson, the politician can invent the people’s message according to his own 
interests. This is arguably what %ăVHVFX is doing here with the topic of 
‘modernization’ – definitely, not a message extracted from the people, but a topical 
choice of his own invention, which is only attributed to the people, as an alleged 
shared concern, yet a very effective choice in the game of mobilization of majorities.    
 These aspects of the logic of the political field are best kept away from the 
public, as this particular speech shows. The protagonist has to conceal from the public 
the extent to which the game of democratic representation is in fact a power game, a 
game in which he is not surrendering his power to the power of the people (submitting 
himself to the people as adjudicator, etc.) but appropriating its power, enlisting the 
adjudicator on his side.  It is quite significant, I think, that, in referring to his 
adversaries, he is representing them as enemies of democracy and of the people. In 
other words, he only places them in the external game, in which they should, but 
allegedly fail to represent the people, and not in the internal game of power in which 
he competes with them. In other words, in order not lose the power game, politicians 
must give visibility to concerns with the democratic game as a game of transparent, 
faithful representation, and conceal other considerations of power as far as possible.
 As Bourdieu observes, regardless of their divergent interests and aims, all 
participants in the struggles of a field will share certain fundamental presuppositions. 
All participants must believe in the game they are playing and in the value of what is 
at stake. There is therefore a fundamental complicity underlying all antagonisms. 
7KHUHVHHPVLQGHHGWREHDOLPLWRQKRZIDU%ăVHVFXFDQJRLQKLVFULWLFDOHYDOXDWLRQ
of how the democratic game is actually played.  He must effectively delegitimize his 
adversaries, but be careful not to delegitimize the game itself, and the idea of 
democratic representation, as this will demobilize the electorate. He is not allowed to 
be cynical, he must not question the belief that democratic representation is in fact 
perfectly possible. He must not endanger the idea that politics involves a collective 
search for ‘truth’ through public deliberation, and that the voices of the public can 
indeed make themselves heard. The outcome he must avoid at all costs is one in 
which the population, already disgusted with the corruption of the political class, 
might refuse to continue to play the game, might refuse, for instance, to show up to 
vote in the referendum. He is in fact quite careful to instil a sense of civic duty and 
commitment in the audience (‘it is our duty to make them do their duty’), as he knows 
that his fate in the internal power game depends vitally on the capacities for 
mobilization he can command. 
 From the point of view of my discussion of legitimacy, it is significant that the 
two ‘games’, while being equally real, are not equally legitimate in the eyes of the 
public. People may accept and understand that politics is also about power, and that it 
couldn’t be otherwise, but more often than not regard this as cynicism on the part of 
politicians, which can lead to cynicism on their part towards politicians. So politicians 
cannot legitimize themselves before the public in terms of how well they observe the 
rules of the game of power, but only in terms of how well they observe the rules of the 
democratic game. Politicians know that they can lose the power game if they are not 
seen to  play the democratic game well enough or if they are seen to be concerned 
only with personal power: the internal game does not mobilize, but the external one 
does. 
 The contradictory nature of the social and political fields manifests itself in a 
diversity of judgements of what is legitimate in politics and political discourse. 
Judgments made by ‘insiders’ of the political game will tend to differ from those of 
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the public. And again such judgments will vary depending on the political, ideological 
position that one is speaking from. These contradictions arise from the absence of 
consensus on substantive issues: a variety of ideologies, visions, truths, vie for 
recognition by as many people as possible. Not one consensus, but a multiplicity of 
agreements are created by politicians around particular visions, particular ‘truths’. 
Although the democratic game claims to be geared to consensus, to the resolution of 
differences of opinion by public deliberation, there are inherent limits placed on this 
game, arising from the need to mobilize majorities so as to be able to serve particular 
power interests and engage in collective action.   
 
 
5. Conclusion. Strategic maneuvering as managing the internal contradictions of 
the political and social fields   
 
So, what does all of the above tell us about how politicians ought to conduct 
arguments of legitimation that are acceptable to a reasonable critic? A neat 
hypothesis, which has the advantage of preserving a parallelism with the distinction 
between ‘rhetorical’ and ‘dialectical’ objectives (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002), 
is that politicians stay within the bounds of reasonableness and of legitimacy as long 
as they strategically maneuver successfully between the constraints of the democratic 
game and those of the power game, i.e. without allowing either game to undermine 
the other. So, strategic maneuvering in the political field could be seen as trying to 
manage a double orientation: an orientation towards the democratic ideal or normative 
vision, at the same time with an orientation to power through mobilization of the 
highest number of voters. This view might suggest that the two games are pulling in 
opposite directions, but this needn’t be the case. In fact, the more convincing the case 
you can make for yourself as a representative of the will of people, and the better you 
can voice the views and interests of your electorate, the higher the number of 
supporters you will probably mobilize.  This is probably because the democratic game 
is always geared to a partial vision and to certain well-defined interests. It is not a 
game of ‘truth’ through critical discussion, although it claims to be that. Only if we 
conceived of the democratic game as a game of the collective search for truth in 
politics, through deliberation that is ideally free and equal, would it be conceivable 
that a politician might lose the power game if he played the democratic game too well, 
i.e. too critically, too openly. For instance, should he allow the public to see through 
the ‘double game’, or to glimpse the multiplicity of relative, partial ‘truths’ and the 
way they feed particular power interests, he might then risk losing the adherence of 
the electorate. Or should he allow debate on  matters of policy that are claimed to be 
in the general interests to go on indefinitely  in a free critical discussion, people might 
discover that was allegedly in the general interest is not in fact in the general interest, 
but serves the interests of one or another party. But the democratic game is not played 
in this way, but is always attached to some existing consensus on one ‘truth’ or 
another and to some particular power position. 
 Because politicians aim to mobilize majorities, they will have to adapt their 
message to a heterogenous public, made up of ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ critics. 
Some will be easier to persuade than others, even when no good reasons are provided, 
but even the most reasonable critics might not ultimately penalize unreasonable 
argumentative behaviour by withdrawing their  consent, but will think first of the 
wider  power objectives that they pursue in supporting a politician. Social actors in the 
social and political field are themselves not free from personal interests and cognitive 
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biases. On the contrary, in supporting a politician, they are pursuing their own 
interests and embracing various political visions or ‘truths’ which may be different 
from those of others. From their own situated perspectives, from which they cannot 
easily step back, they are likely to view certain argumentative maneuvers with a 
critical eye or to completely overlook moves which other actors may consider 
unacceptable. Because of the logic of the field, as a field of forces and struggles for 
power, even ‘reasonable critics’ may behave like pragmatists and adopt a rhetorical 
perspective on reasonableness: anything that works with the electorate and obtains 
more votes for our candidate, by any means, is reasonable, given that the ends pursued 
are considered legitimate. This is how parts of the Romanian electorate probably 
reasoned in the 2004 elections, when %ăVHVFX was massively supported by everyone 
who identified himself with the battle against corruption, and most prominently by 
Romania’s leading critical intellectuals. The overlapping consensus that %ăVHVFX 
exploited and benefited from at the time consisted mainly in the population’s attitude 
towards the corruption of the political class.  By contrast, when dealing with political 
adversaries, the reasonable critic might adopt a less lenient perspective and to penalize 
unreasonable moves and show how they are geared exclusively to power interest or to 
illegitimate political visions. This is presumably because judgments of reasonableness 
in politics, like judgements of legitimacy, tend to be made from the perspective of a 
situated social and political position, from a particular set of values, beliefs, norms, 
goals, from the perspective of a particular truth.  
 In addition,  because of the ‘homology’ that Bourdieu speaks of between the 
political field and the fields in which a politician’s supporters are playing, and which 
are affected by the outcome of the political battle,  behind the electorate’s massive 
support for %ăVHVFX there also seemed to lie the realization that, in the Romanian 
context, a politician that behaved differently, that did not do precisely those things 
which the critical intellectuals would have otherwise been critical of, would not after 
all, in a sense, behave reasonably SROLWLFDOO\ VSHDNLQJ %ăVHVFX ZRXOG QRW KDYH
served the interests of his electorate well if he had behaved in a way which would 
have lost him votes or would have placed him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis his 
competitors in the political field.  So, a definition of reasonableness in the political 
field will probably have to incorporate the notion of power and of serving the interests 
of the electorate one represents, in the process of fighting your opponents. And this is 
my first point in trying to move towards a conclusion. 
 But there clearly has to be more to judgments of reasonableness and 
legitimacy than the way they serve power positions from particular perspectives. And 
this is the second point I am suggesting towards a conclusion and it is inspired by 
Scott Jacobs’s (2002) discussion of the contextual nature of fallacies, as it seems to 
account very well for the reception of %ăVHVFX’s discourse since 2004. The fact is that 
%ăVHVFX¶V frequently unreasonable argumentative moves (part of what I have 
analyzed elsewhere as a radical version of populism – ,HĠFX  ,HĠFX-Fairclough 
 ,HĠFX-Fairclough in press) have been constantly welcomed, not criticized, in 
Romania, as being well-adjusted to the Romanian electorate, which they have seen in 
terms of a predominantly parochial and dependent political culture and inertial, 
traditionalist political options. In such contexts, as Jacobs suggests, moves which may 
otherwise be judged fallacious may actually constitute constructive contributions to 
the public debate, place people a better position to decide what to do, who to vote for.  
In other words, reasonable argumentation can be viewed, following Jacobs, as 
argumentation that adjusts to the practical demands of the situation, that makes the 
best of a less-than-ideal situation, and of an audience which does not approximate the 
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‘reasonable critic’ except maybe to an insignificant degree. This view does not 
collapse into a rhetorical view. Reasonable argumentation will be that argumentation 
which, given what the situation is, and what the available alternatives are, will not 
merely take advantage of the situation (of the ignorance and gullibility of the public) 
but will try to improve the conditions for deliberation, create a space for reflection on 
different views, help people move a little closer to being reasonable critics or rational 
judges, and thus enable them to come to a better informed decision. One can argue of 
course that this is not what the majority of %ăVHVFX’s supporters saw and valued in 
him at the time, but this could provide a criterion for evaluating argumentation that 
incorporates facts about the context and its limitations. And it can also be argued that 
some of %ăVHVFX’s attempts at self-legitimation during the 2004 campaign did 
contribute to improving the conditions of deliberation in precisely the sense above.  
So, my second concluding point would be that judgments of reasonableness and of 
legitimacy in the political field, should be placed in concrete political, social contexts, 
and assessed in terms of the shared beliefs and norms of a given community and in 
terms of how they attempt to transform these contexts.  
 Thirdly, it would seem that we cannot define the specific character of 
reasonable or fallacious argumentation for the political field and the activity types 
associated with the various games played within it, as such. Judgements of what is 
reasonable vary, as I have indicated, according to the positions people occupy in the 
political practice, as ‘insiders’ to the political game or as ‘outsiders’, as supporters or 
opponents of particular politicians or ideological positions.  If one draws on Bourdieu, 
one will tend towards a sociological view which focuses on what people in various 
social fields and social practices take to be reasonable argumentation. The view 
suggested by Beetham is also a sociologist’s perspective, a view of legitimacy-in-
context. So I would like to conclude by posing a question: as pragma-dialectics moves 
towards a concern with differences between social fields, social practices, and activity 
types with respect to reasonableness and fallacies, in what way can the differences 
and the relationships between judgements of reasonableness on the part of participants 
in specific social practices and on the part of critical analysts – or between practical 
and theoretical judgements of reasonableness – be given further consideration? And 
more specifically, what might a sociological perspective have to say about 
philosophical, theoretical and critical conceptions of reason and reasonableness that 
might enrich the pragma-dialectical view?  
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1
 The disadvantages of a purely descriptive view are immediately obvious.  Belief in the 
legitimacy of power can be achieved in various ways, including through ideological 
propaganda, and people may have reasons for believing that power is legitimate which have 
nothing to do with the qualities of the system. In addition, it is not in fact even necessary for 
belief in the legitimacy of a power regime to prevail among a majority of a population in 
order for that regime to survive unchallenged. It is sufficient for such beliefs to exist among 
the relevant power elites; most other people will go along with a system of power either 
through coercion, following perceptions of their own powerlessness or of the ways in which 
an illegitimate power system serves their own interests, or other reasons which may not 
involve belief in legitimacy. Furthermore, as Beetham (1991) observes, the view of legitimacy 
as belief in legitimacy has the unwanted consequence that a totalitarian system of power might 
be considered legitimate as long as it successfully managed to indoctrinate a sufficient 
number of the population into believing that it is legitimate. 
 
2
 Problems with normative approaches have been pointed out. One refers to the very 
possibility of consensus. For some theorists, the search for consensus involves an attempt at 
universalization, a ‘reduction to consensus’, which tries to level off irreducible differences 
which should be given recognition instead (Christiano 2004). It is nevertheless possible to 
preserve the notion of reasonable consensus by viewing it, as Rawls does, as an overlapping 
consensus. Citizens, that is, do not have to agree on everything but only on those principles 
that apply to the basic structure of society. A normative approach  also seems to presuppose a 
unique interpretation of what it is reasonable to believe and desire with respect to social and 
political arrangements. But, if there is reasonable disagreement about the demands of reason 
itself, i.e., if there are different conceptions of reasonableness, then groups within a 
community may have different understandings of what is publicly justified within that 
community, and hence different notions of what institutions might be legitimate for that 
community (D’Agostino 2007).   
 
3
 %ăVHVFX¶VSDUWLDOO\LPSOLFLWDUJXPHQWFDQEHVDLGWRJRDVIROORZV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1.1. I have become involved in the activity of the law, government, secret services, 
Parliament, education, health etc. 
1.1.’ This involvement is equal to an attempt to modernize Romania, place institutions in the 
service of the people, etc. 
1.1’.1. The people believe that institutions should represent their interests, that Romania 
ought to become a modern state, etc. (Beetham’s second level, of shared beliefs) 
1.1’.2. My actions have obeyed the rules of the democratic political game (i.e. 
representation, etc.) (Betham’s first level, of rules) 
1. Therefore, my position is legitimate. 
 
His opponents’ argument is the following: 
 
 %ăVHVFX KDV EHFRPH LQYROYHG LQ WKH DFWLYLW\ RI WKH ODZ JRYHUQPHQW VHFUHW VHUYLFHV
Parliament, education, health etc. 
2.1’. Being thus involved is tantamount to a violation of legitimate prerogatives granted by 
the Constitution.  
2.1’.1. The people believe that the Constitution should be respected.  
2.1’.2. The President is not observing the Constitution. 
7KHUHIRUH%ăVHVFX¶VSRVLWLRQLVQRWOHJLWLPDWH 
 
 
